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Abstract 
Two studies were conducted to test the predictions of a multi-component model of distinctiveness-
based illusory correlation (IC) regarding the use of episodic and evaluative information in the 
production of the phenomenon.  Extending on the standard paradigm, participants were presented 
with 4 groups decreasing in size, but all exhibiting the same ratio of positive to negative behaviours.  
Study 1 (N = 75) specifically tested the role of group size and distinctiveness, by including a zero-
frequency cell in the design. Consistent with predictions drawn from the proposed model, with 
decreasing group size, the magnitude of the IC effect showed a linear increase in judgments thought 
to be based on evaluative information. In study 2 (N = 43), a number of changes were introduced to a 
group assignment task (double presentation, inclusion of decoys) that allowed a more rigorous test of 
the predicted item-specific memory effects. In addition, a new multilevel, mixed logistic regression 
approach to signal-detection type analysis was used, providing a more flexible and reliable analysis 
than previously.  Again, with decreasing group size, IC effects showed the predicted monotonic 
increase on the measures (group assignment frequencies, likability ratings) thought to be dependent 
on evaluative information. At the same time, measures thought to be based on episodic information 
(free recall and group assignment accuracy) partly revealed the predicted enhanced episodic memory 
for smaller groups and negative items, while also supporting a distinctiveness-based approach. 
Additional analysis revealed that the pattern of results for judgments though to be based on 
evaluative information was independent of interpersonal variation in behavioral memory, as predicted 
by the multi-component model, and in contrast to predictions of the competing models. The results 
are discussed in terms of the implications of the findings for the proposed mechanisms of illusory 
correlation. 
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Humans sometimes show an unsettling insensitivity for actual relationships between events and often 
seem to perceive a covariation when there is none, a bias that has been labeled illusory correlation 
(IC). This bias has important practical consequences as it has been suggested that it contributes to 
stereotyping (Hamilton, 1981), faulty clinical judgments (Dawes, 1989; Chapman & Chapman, 1967), 
depression (Seligman, 1975) and minority discrimination (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). The 
paradigmatic demonstration of this IC bias in social psychology comes from a study on the formation 
of group stereotypes by Hamilton and Gifford (1976). In their study, participants read behavioral 
statements about members of a majority group, labeled A, and a minority group, labeled B. Both 
groups revealed the same ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors (9:4), but twice as many 
statements referred to members of group A than to members of group B. As such, there was no 
objective correlation between group membership and desirability of behavior. Nevertheless, after 
reading all statements, participants showed greater liking for the majority group A than for the 
minority group B. In addition, perceivers overestimated the frequency with which members of the 
minority group B had engaged in the less frequent undesirable behaviors. This result demonstrated 
that a simple asymmetry in information sampling can lead to differential perception of social groups.  
Distinctiveness Account 
The most dominant theoretical explanation for IC in the last decades has been the distinctiveness-
based explanation (DBE; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). Its basic premise is that infrequent or otherwise 
salient items are encoded more extensively at exposure and are therefore more accessible later, 
when judgments are made. According to this reasoning, in a typical IC experiment, the small number 
of minority and undesirable behaviors makes them more salient or distinctive, leading to an 
overestimation of the frequency of these behaviors and less liking of the minority group B.  
 A number of studies seem to support this premise. Hamilton, Dugan and Trollier (1985) 
showed that IC only occurs if information is presented in a typical sequential fashion (statement per 
statement) and not when information is presented in a summary table that tends to attenuate the 
saliency of undesirable minority (or B-) behaviors. Further evidence for the enhanced encoding of 
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distinctive items comes from a study by Stroessner, Hamilton and Mackie (1992), who found that 
participants spend more time reading distinctive B- items than the other items. Several studies also 
found that B- items are better retrieved in free recall tasks (Hamilton et al., 1985; Stroessner et al., 
1992; McConnell, Sherman & Hamilton, 1994) and assigned faster to their group than the other 
behaviors (Johnson and Mullen, 1994; McConnell et al., 1994). Hamilton et al. (1985) found a high 
correlation between recall of group B behaviors and evaluative judgments of group B, indicating that 
the high accessibility of group B behaviors influenced evaluative judgments about this group. Most of 
the empirical support for the basic assumption of the DBE, namely that IC results from distinctive 
items being more extensively encoded and more accessible in memory, has been obtained in 
experiments using only one large and one small group.  In a notable exception, Sherman, Hamilton 
and Roskos-Ewoldsen (1989) found that including a third group C that was smaller, identical or larger 
in size than group B diminished, but did not eliminate the IC effect involving group B. Importantly, this 
was the case both when B- behaviors were the most distinctive (when group C was larger or identical 
in size) as well as when they were not (when group C was smaller) - a finding that clearly challenges 
the original DBE. The need for a more conclusive definition of “distinctiveness” was further illustrated 
by a recent study by Risen, Gilovich & Dunning (2007): In a number of studies, they revealed the 
emergence of one-shot illusory correlations, by showing that a single instance of unusual behavior by 
a member of a rare group is sufficient to create an association between group and behavior. Using 
real groups, their results showed that single unusual behaviors committed by members of rare groups 
were processed differently than other types of behaviors, and were more memorable.   In sum, these 
studies suggest that a more thorough exploration of how distinctiveness drives IC is in order.  Our 
studies are, in part, designed to do this.  
Alternative Accounts 
A number of authors have suggested alternative accounts of IC that differ drastically from the original 
DBE. Fiedler’s Information Loss Account (Fiedler, 1996; Fiedler, Kemmelmeier, & Freytag, 1999) 
states that illusory correlation results from better extraction of information about the majority than 
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minority group, leading to greater regression to the mean in perceptions of the positive-to-negative 
ratio of the minority group. More specifically, it is argued that group judgments are based on traces 
that are retrieved from stored exemplars in memory and then aggregated, according to a simple 
weighted linear summation. This aggregation process cancels out unsystematic information or 
encoding errors and so reinforces systematic tendencies. It is sensitive to group size: as the amount 
of observations on which decisions are based increases, less error variance is left in the aggregate, 
rendering perceptions of the group more accurate and leading to less biased judgments (see Fiedler, 
1996, p. 200-201, section on “Illusory correlation simulation”). Within the typical IC design, this 
process results in an evaluative bias that favors the majority group, as its larger group size allows 
better reproduction of its aggregate, evaluative characteristics (i.e. more desirable than undesirable 
information). Because of its smaller size, the true ratio of positive to negative behaviors is learned 
less well for the minority group, leading to a more extensive regression to the mean in judgments 
about the minority group. A number of studies (Fiedler, 1991; 1996) have supported this account, 
basically showing the occurrence of IC in the absence of distinctive behavior and without better 
memory for infrequent events.  
 
McGarty, Haslam, Turner and Oakes (1993) have suggested that IC results from a differentiation 
process, in which perceivers accentuate differences between the groups based on the valence of the 
behaviors (see also Berndsen & Spears, 1997). Given that there is more information on the positive 
behaviors of group A, there is more evidence for the hypothesis that Group A is better than Group B, 
than for the opposite hypothesis. This forms the basis for further accentuating the apparent evaluative 
differences between the groups, leading to an IC effect (Berndsen & Spears, 1997; Haslam, McGarty 
& Brown, 1996; McGarty et al., 1993). According to this perspective, strictly speaking, the distinction 
that achieves the greatest differentiation involves assigning all positive behaviors to group A and all 
negative behaviors to group B.  A number of studies have provided support for this account. It has 
been found that the IC disappears when two well-known groups differ on a non-evaluative dimension 
that does not provide a meaningful (i.e., clear and separable) distinction between behaviors and 
groups, such as right- versus left-handedness (Haslam et al., 1996) or group members' gender 
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(Klauer & Meiser, 2000). The constructive nature of the categorization process has been illustrated by 
data showing that participants actively interpret the behavioral statements over the course of the 
stimulus presentation in light of the developing group differentiation and that the IC develops and 
strengthens towards the end of the experiment (Berndsen, Spears, McGarty & van der Pligt, 1998).  
 
Recently, Sherman and colleagues (2009) proposed a theoretical framework based on Attention 
Theory (Kruschke, 2001, 2003) that integrates a number of the previous accounts.  Their model 
extends the traditional distinctiveness explanation, by positing that differentiation occurs via a focus 
on contextually distinct information. Because there is more information about the majority group, 
features of the majority group are learned before features of the minority group. The features of the 
minority group that subsequently stand out, are those that most distinguish it from what has been 
established about the majority group, serving to further differentiate the groups. Consistent with this, 
they found that participants paid more attention to common (positive) than rare (negative) behaviors 
when reading about majority group members, but rare traits received more attention when reading 
about minority group members (see Sherman et al., 2009, Experiment 5).  So as with the 
distinctiveness account, special attention is paid to infrequent behaviors performed by members of 
the minority group. However, unlike that account, and more in line with the differentiation account, 
this model proposes that the basis for that attention is contextual distinctiveness in relation to the 
majority group, rather than absolute numerical distinctiveness. As such, the Attention Theory model, 
or AT model, is a combination of a distinctiveness and differentiation approach. 
Multiple component model 
Each of the above explanations has received considerable empirical support, where support for any 
particular account over others is typically found with some manipulations and measures, but not with 
others. The models of Fiedler (1991) and McGarty et al. (1993) share the common feature that they 
do not give any special status to small group rare behavior events, and thus have trouble accounting 
for evidence indicating enhanced memory for such events. The distinctiveness explanation, on the 
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other hand, has trouble accounting for the occurrence of ICs in the absence of superior memory for 
these events.  As such, the picture that emerges is that of illusory correlation as a complex, multiply 
determined phenomenon.  A number of authors have therefore suggested that it might be useful to 
distinguish between different components underlying IC (Johnson & Mullen, 1994; Johnson, Mullen, 
Carlson & Southwick, 2001). This idea was further extended and implemented in a connectionist 
model of group processes by Van Rooy et al. (2003), who applied it to a number of group biases, 
including IC. According to this model, to which we will refer as the Multiple Component Model (MCM), 
perceivers create a mental representation containing connections of a social group with a global 
evaluative impression, and with episodic behavioral information. More particularly, perceivers are 
thought to incrementally develop prototypes of both the majority and minority group that contain 
mainly evaluative (desirable or undesirable) information, but also store item-specific behavioral 
information (an episodic trace). With every statement presented, that prototype is updated using a 
connectionist learning algorithm (i.e., the delta algorithm by McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988). For 
instance, if the information describes a member of group A performing a desirable behavior (“John, 
member of group A, helps an old lady across the street”), the connection between the group A and a 
desirable evaluation becomes stronger. At the same time, the specific behavior is encoded in an 
episodic trace that is connected to group A as well. Thus, each piece of behavioral information is 
encoded at two levels: Its evaluative meaning ("the behavior is good") and its unique episodic 
meaning ("helps an old lady across the street"). 
 Due to their separate representation, the MCM makes different predictions for judgments 
based on evaluative versus episodic information.  On judgments that do not require the retrieval of 
item-specific episodic information (likeability ratings of the group, frequency estimation and 
assignment of behaviors to groups), the model predicts an evaluative bias in favor of the majority 
group. The reason is that more information is added so that the evaluative connections with the group 
grow stronger. Crucially, increasing connections on the group level impairs memory for discrete 
episodic traces of information. This prediction is based on a principle of competition between the 
weights of the connections, so that stronger (evaluative) connections tend to block the development 
of weaker (episodic) connections (see Van Rooy et al., 2003, p. 540, section on “Competition 
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property and discounting”). This principle is akin to the ideas of discounting in causal explanation 
(Kelley, 1971) and associative learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), which say that stronger 
explanations tend to overshadow weaker ones. Because of its greater group size, this impairment of 
episodic connections is more detrimental for the majority group A as compared to the minority group 
B, leading to better retrieval of minority behaviors. Also, because there are typically more desirable 
behaviors than undesirable in an IC experiment, stronger memory impairment occurs for desirable 
behaviors, leading to better retrieval of undesirable behaviors (i.e., B- behaviors). These memory 
effects are predicted to be revealed in accuracy measures of episodic traces, such as accuracy of 
group assignment and free recall. Van Rooy, Van Overwalle et al. (2003) have illustrated how their 
model can account for a number of critical IC findings, and it’s basic tenet that illusory correlation 
effects reflect incomplete learning rather than a bias due to information loss was recently confirmed 
by Murphy, Schmeer, Vallée-Tourangeau, Mondragón, & Hilton (2011). 
 
The Current Studies 
In two studies, we set out to test the predictions of the MCM model of how different types of 
information in a classic IC design contribute to produce the typical IC effects on different dependent 
measures. We chose to focus on the MCM, not because it is superior to other accounts, but rather 
because it generates predictions about how the application of episodic and evaluative information 
evolves in function of sample size. No study to date has tested these predictions directly, and a 
number of modifications were applied to the standard IC design and it’s analysis to make this 
possible.  
 The first difference with previous studies is the use of four instead of two groups, decreasing 
in size while maintaining the usual 2-to-1 ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviors. Although 
previous studies have extended the IC design in comparable ways (see Fiedler, 1991; Sherman et 
al., 1989), none of these studies used appropriate memory measures (see below) to analyse episodic 
item memory. The MCM predicts that, as group size decreases, a monotone increase in ICs should 
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be apparent in evaluative measures for which participants rely on a general group impression, rather 
than specific items (likability ratings, frequency estimation, group assignment task). In contrast, in 
terms of episodic information, the MCM predicts that item memory should improve as events become 
less frequent. In other words, it predicts that real item-memory should improve as group size 
decreases, and a memory advantage for (less frequent) negative events should become apparent. 
 To test the MCM predictions regarding episodic memory, we will apply a novel multilevel 
approach to signal detection analysis. We chose signal detection analysis, as a number of authors 
have illustrated that it performs better than threshold models (see Klauer & Meiser, 2000), particularly 
in unbalanced designs (Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Slotnick, Dodson, Klein & Shimamura, 2000; see 
Method section), although Klauer and Kellen (2010) have contested Slotnick et al.'s arguments. This 
analysis enables us to reliably test the MCM prediction that enhanced behavioral memory for smaller 
groups is revealed in judgments driven by item-specific, episodic information, and this quite 
independently from the bias apparent in judgments based on evaluative information.  
Experiment 1: Group size and evaluative information 
In this experiment, we set out to test our main group size manipulation and further explore the role of 
distinctiveness. As mentioned, the MCM predicts a monotonic increase in illusory correlations in 
function of decreasing sample size, which should be apparent in the likeability ratings, frequency 
estimation tasks and the group assignment data. To investigate to role of distinctiveness in the 
current design, we included a zero-frequency cell by removing all undesirable behavioral statements 
from the minority group D. A similar manipulation has been applied by other studies (Fiedler, 1991; 
Shavitt, Sanbonmatsu, Smittipatana & Posavac, 1999), but not in combination with the current group 
size manipulation and memory analysis, which are critical in testing the MCM predictions. The MCM 
predicts a monotone decrease in evaluative ratings in function of a smaller group size, regardless of 
the empty cell. This is because at the level of general, evaluative information, decreasing group size 
will result in impaired encoding of the groups’ evaluative characteristics, leading to stronger IC 
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effects. At the same time, the MCM predicts stronger memory for discrete episodic traces in function 
of decreasing group size.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 75 female and male freshmen from the Dutch speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
who participated for a partial requirement of an introductory psychology course. They were tested 
individually in cubicles. 
Materials 
In a preliminary study, a list of 100 Dutch statements describing everyday behaviors (“John helps an 
old lady across the street”, “Albert is very modest”) was presented to a group of 70 students that 
rated each statement on a five-point scale in terms of desirability. Hamilton and Sherman (1989) 
showed that the typical IC effects are most likely to occur when participants are presented with 
moderately desirable statements. Therefore, only statements with moderate mean values of 
desirability and undesirability (0.5 < M < 2.5 for undesirable and 3.5 < M < 4.5 for desirable 
behaviors) were selected for use in the experiment. This resulted in an experimental set of 45 
statements, consisting of 30 moderately desirable behaviors and 15 moderately undesirable 
behaviors.  
For each participant, these statements were randomly assigned to four groups in accordance 
to the frequencies in Table 1. The ratio of desirable to undesirable behavior was 2 to 1 in every 
group, so there was no objective relationship between group membership and evaluative character of 
the behaviors. To avoid any gender bias, names (“John)” were replaced by initials (“J.”) in the actual 
experiments. This means that each statement presented to a participant consisted of an initial, a 
group designation (A, B, C or D), and a behavior. For example: “J., member of group A, helped an old 
lady across the street”. 
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Procedure 
Participants sat at individual computers and instructions appeared on the PC screen. They were 
informed that the experiment concerned “the way people process and retain information” and that 
they would receive information concerning four groups, A, B, C and D. They were told that these 
represented groups in the real world and that group A was bigger than group B, group B bigger than 
group C and so on. Finally, they were instructed to read each statement carefully. Each statement 
remained on the screen until the participant pushed the space bar. After reading all statements, 
participants completed a filler task that lasted about 3 minutes. In this filler task, a number appeared 
on the screen and participants had to press the corresponding key on the number pad as soon as 
possible. 
After the filler task, participants completed a number of tasks in the following order (Because no 
effect of group labels or order of tasks were found in pilot studies, these manipulations were left out of 
the design of this experiment). 
Free recall. Participants were provided with a blank piece of paper and were instructed by the 
computer to write down as many of the statements as they could recall, including the group 
membership of the actor that engaged in the behavior. If they could not remember group 
membership, they were encouraged to guess. After 20 minutes, the experimenter collected the 
papers. In all the experiments, two judges, blind to experimental manipulations, scored free recall 
data by using a gist criterion. In case of dispute, the decision of a third judge prevailed. Note that 
group labels were ignored in scoring accuracy of the recalled statements, because this makes it a 
more adequate measure of pure episodic (behavioral) memory. 
Likeability rating. Participants were presented with 5 positive and 5 negative adjectives. For 
each group they were asked to indicate to what degree each of these adjectives was appropriate to 
describe members of that group on a 10-point scale ranging from not appropriate at all (1) to very 
appropriate (10). These 10 ratings were averaged to represent the perceived likeability of the group. 
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Group assignment. The 45 statements, without group membership, were presented again to the 
participants in a random order. Participants indicated as fast as possible which group member they 
thought had engaged in the behavior by pressing one of four keys on the keyboard. 
Frequency estimation. Participants were given the total amount of statements for each group 
and were then asked to indicate how many of these behaviors were undesirable. 
After completing these measures, participants were debriefed, thanked for their cooperation and 
urged not to share any information concerning the experiments with other students.  
Data Analysis 
Is noted earlier, we apply a novel multilevel approach to signal detection analysis. The norm within 
most memory recognition research is to calculate hit and false alarm rates for each participant and 
within-participant condition, and then to compare these aggregate measures. However, given the 
small and unequal cell sizes in our design, such an approach would produce unreliable estimates. 
Instead, we introduce a mixed logit model analysis (i.e., multilevel logistic regression) that provides 
an alternative way of performing signal detection analysis by moving away from analyzing aggregate 
level data (see also DeCarlo, 1998). The use of a regression model also provides an added degree of 
flexibility in analyzing the impact of continuous variables, such as reading time. But most importantly, 
mixed models have been shown to avoid spurious effects better, and have more power than 
traditional ANOVA analysis (Jaeger, 2008). See Appendix for more details. 
Results 
Group Impression 
The results are listed in the top panel of Table 2. Overall, the results show the predicted pattern for 
group impression (i.e., likeability ratings, frequency estimates and group assignment). Note that the 
group assignment measure indicates how desirable versus undesirable behaviors are attributed to a 
group, and thus reflects general group impressions. The results indicate that participants estimated 
the amount of undesirable behaviors in groups A and D to be equal. This clearly contradicts the DBE, 
which predicted a higher estimate for group C. Interestingly, this also indicates that participants 
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overestimated the frequency of undesirable behaviors in group D, which were actually zero. The data 
were statistically analyzed with an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Group Size (A to D) and, when 
appropriate, Desirability (desirable versus undesirable behavior) as within-participants factors. Apart 
from an omnibus ANOVA, we also conducted contrast analyses to see whether any effect of Group 
Size was linear, as we would predict.  The critical effects of Group Size and linear trends are reported 
in the table. 
Likeability ratings. As can be seen in Table 2, the likeability ratings reveal the predicted 
decrease of likeability for smaller groups, and this decrease was linear. 
Frequency estimates. As predicted, there was a significant increase of estimated undesirable 
behaviors, although this increase was not linear. Post-hoc contrast analyses show that participants 
estimated the proportion of undesirable behaviors to be smaller for groups A and D than for groups B 
and C, F(1, 74) = 13.27, p < .001. As noted earlier, there was no difference in estimates between 
groups A and D, p > .9, despite the actual absence of any undesirable behavior in group D. 
Group assignment. As can be seen in Table 2, an omnibus ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
group size. As the actual proportions (between parentheses in the table) are already showing a linear 
decreasing pattern, a test for linear trend is theoretically not very meaningful for this measure. Of 
more interest are the deviations from that pattern, specifically, whether desirable and undesirable 
behaviors differ within groups. Consistent with predictions, contrast analyses show that participants 
tended to assign more desirable than undesirable behaviors to group A, F(1, 74) = 13.54, p < .001. In 
contrast, as predicted, participants tended to assign more undesirable than desirable behaviors to 
group B, F(1, 74) = 3.38, p < .07, and group C, F(1, 74) = 8.31, p < .001. There was no significant 
difference in assignments for group D, p > .70, which again indicates that participants wrongly 
assigned undesirable behaviors to group D (although there were none).  
Item-Specific Memory 
To analyze item-specific memory, we subjected not only free recall data, but also the group 
assignment data to an accuracy analysis, using multi-level analysis. Unlike the standard group 
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assignment analysis, which reflects general group impressions, the accuracy analysis should reflect 
true memory. 
Free recall. The results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 2. Overall, the memory 
measures were generally quite weak for free recall. The structural zero D-cell makes an omnibus 
ANOVA not possible for these measures. Hence, separate ANOVA’s were conducted for desirable 
and undesirable behaviors.  A marginally significant effect of group size was found for desirable 
behaviors. This was mainly due to the higher recall of D+ behaviors as compared to recall of the 
other desirable behaviors, F(1, 70) = 3.40, p = .07. There was no significant effect of group size in 
recall for undesirable behaviors. As predicted, undesirable behaviors were generally better recalled 
than desirable behaviors, F(1, 70) = 26.22, p < .001. 
Group assignment accuracy. Multilevel logistic regression analysis revealed that assignment 
accuracy shows a decreasing linear trend as groups become smaller, β = -.24, p < .01. Moderator 
analysis revealed a significant interaction between valence and linear trend, X2(1) = 13.57, p < .001, 
indicating that accuracy for positive and negative items developed differently in function of group size. 
Further tests revealed that accuracy decreased for positive items, β = -0.32, p < .001, but not for 
negative items (p > .3).  There was no significant change in accuracy for C- items (p > .9). We also 
failed to find a significant relationship between reading time and accuracy. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 1 confirm the hypothesized impact of group size on IC effects. 
Making group size smaller across four groups, with the same 2:1 ratio of positive to negative 
behaviors, led to a linear decrease in positive, evaluative judgments across the groups. This linear 
trend is fully in line with the MCM, and clearly not compatible with any notion of special 
distinctiveness for a particular group. This interpretation is further strengthened by the occurrence of 
significant IC effects for the smallest group D in the absence of D- behaviors.  Importantly, although a 
key prediction of both the MCM and ILA, this is in fact the first study that clearly reveals this predicted 
linear trend. 
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With respect to item-specific memory, the analysis of group assignment accuracy revealed a 
significant decrease with decreasing group size for desirable items, while there was no change for 
undesirable items. This is clearly inconsistent with the MCM, which predicted an increase in 
assignment accuracy, and is more in line with and information loss account (Fiedler, 1991). However, 
the results obtained for free recall were less straightforward. We found a marginally significant 
increase in the recall of desirable behaviors for the smallest D group compared to the other three 
groups, and better overall recall for undesirable as compared to desirable behaviors. Both of these 
results provide some support for the MCM and a distinctiveness account. However, the generally low 
level of memory performance and absence of distinctive negative items for group D, suggest that 
these results should be interpreted with some caution. 
Experiment 2: Increasing Episodic Memory 
Some aspects of item-specific memory performance in Experiment 1 were inconclusive. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, we made two adjustments to achieve more reliable memory performance. First, we 
modified the group assignment task so as to isolate and eliminate evaluative guessing biases as 
much as possible. Given that group assignments are susceptible to IC, it is highly probable that 
participants use the desirability of behavior to guess that the statement came from group A. Given the 
high prevalence of positive A behaviors, this strategy may be quite successful. To identify these 
guessing biases in the group assignment task, decoy items were added that were identical to the 
original statements, but reversed in valence. For instance, instead of stating that an actor “helped the 
old lady across the street”, in these decoys it is said that the actor “did not help the old lady across 
the street” (for a somewhat different type of “distractors”, see Klauer & Meiser, 2000; Fiedler, 1993). 
Assigning these decoy items to a group indicates that a guessing strategy was used based on the 
behavior’s desirability, rather than true memory. In addition to an accuracy analysis, we can also 
analyze whether participants’ ability to distinguish between an old item (i.e., an item that was 
presented previously) and a decoy was affected by group size – in other words, whether participants 
were more accurate in recognizing old items from smaller groups. If memory is indeed enhanced for 
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smaller groups, as predicted by the MCM, such a pattern should be revealed in the ability to 
distinguish between old items and decoys.    
Second, all statements containing behavioral information about the groups were presented 
twice, which we hoped would enhance free recall and lead to stronger memory in both the group 
assignment and free recall task. Presenting items twice is, as far as we know, a new procedure in the 
illusory correlation literature (but not in person memory, see Hamilton et al., 1981). As mentioned 
earlier, the MCM predicts better memory at the level of item-memory for smaller groups and for 
undesirable behaviors. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 43 female and male freshmen from the Dutch speaking Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
who participated for a partial requirement of an introductory psychology course. They were tested 
individually in cubicles.  
Materials and Procedures 
The same stimulus materials and procedure were used as in Experiment 1 with the following 
exceptions. First, the complete set of statements was presented twice, separated by a pause screen 
saying that “all statements will be presented for a second time”. Second, in the group assignment 
task, not only the 45 original statements, but also 45 decoy statements were randomly presented. 
These items were identical to the original items, but reversed in valence. Participants were asked to 
press one of four buttons to indicate which group they thought the behavior came from, or a fifth 
button if they thought it was an item they had not seen before. 
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Results 
Group Impression 
The results and the F-values of Group Size and the linear trend analyses are depicted in the top 
panel of Table 3. Overall, the results confirm the decreasing pattern in group impression predicted by 
the alternative models:  
Likeability ratings. There was a significant decrease in likeability for the smaller groups and this 
trend was linear. 
Frequency estimates. There was a significant increase in the estimated proportion of 
undesirable behaviors for smaller groups, and this trend was also linear. 
Group assignment task. An omnibus ANOVA revealed a main effect of Group Size (see Table 
3) and Desirability, F(1, 42) = 258.71, p < .001, as well as a significant interaction, F(3, 126) = 39.15, 
p < .001. As predicted by the alternative models, subsequent contrast analyses showed that more 
desirable than undesirable behaviors were assigned to group A, F(1, 42) = 110.86, p < .001, as well 
as for group B although to a smaller degree, F(1, 42) = 4.15, p < .05. There was no significant 
difference in assigning desirable and undesirable behaviors to group C and group D. 
Item-Specific Memory 
The results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 3. As we had hoped for, the memory measures 
were much stronger, allowing us to perform a more reliable analysis. 
Free Recall. An omnibus ANOVA revealed that free recall was better for smaller groups, and 
this trend was linear. No other effects were significant. 
Group assignment accuracy. Multilevel logistic regression analysis revealed that assignment 
accuracy increased as groups became smaller, β = .08, p < .05.  Adding a term testing for a quadratic 
trend did not improve the fit of the model (p > .07). Further tests showed that, compared to negative 
items, accuracy was reduced for positive items, β2 = -0.72, p < .001. Moderation analysis did not 
reveal any significant interaction effects. As in experiment 1, we failed to find a significant relationship 
between reading time and accuracy. 
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Decoy analysis. The inclusion of decoy items allowed us to apply a more elaborate signal-
detection type of analysis, in which we used participants’ ability to distinguish between originals and 
decoys as a measure of memory sensitivity (see Appendix for more details). These analyses 
revealed that, as one would expect, participants respond “old” more to items they have seen before, 
rather than to decoys, β = 2.21, p < .001. There was also a main effect of valence. Compared to 
negative items, participants were in general more likely to categorize positive items as “old” rather 
than decoys, β = .51, p < .001. Moderator analysis revealed a significant interaction between valence 
and whether the item was old or a decoy, X2(1) = 5.23, p <. 02, showing that participants were more 
accurate for negative items, β = 2.29, than positive items, β = 1.87. Further moderator tests revealed 
a marginal linear (p ≈ .5) and slightly stronger increasing quadratic trend (p < .05) in memory 
performance. Follow-up analysis revealed that this was mainly due to an increase in memory 
sensitivity for items from group D. This was apparent in the interaction effect between whether the 
item was old or a decoy, and whether or not it came from group D, X2(1)=11.26, p < . 001. This effect 
was further moderated by valence, X2(1) = 15.33, p < .001, revealing that participants were more 
accurate for negative D items, β = 2.30, than for positive D items, β = 0.22. 
Discussion 
In Study 2, the predicted effect of increasingly negative group impressions given smaller groups was 
again observed in the likeability ratings, frequency estimates and group assignments. In addition, 
memory for behavioral information improved compared to Study 1: Both free recall data and group 
assignment accuracy revealed that episodic memory improved for smaller groups, which is in line 
with MCM predictions. The decoy analysis provided some further support for this, by revealing a 
marginal, increasing linear trend in memory performance. Follow-up analysis revealed that this was 
mainly due to improved performance for negative D items. However, contrary to a distinctiveness-
based explanation, this superior memory for D- items did not affect the results on the other 
dependent measures (likeability ratings, frequency estimates and group assignments), which showed 
the same monotone increase in negativity in function of decreasing group size as in study 1. This 
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strongly suggest that participants did not rely on enhanced episodic item-memory for infrequent 
events for judgments on these measures, but rather on the more available evaluative information, 
which is in line with MCM predictions.  
 
Despite the enhanced memory performance, the general IC pattern for both likability ratings and 
frequency estimates (apart from the influence of the missing D- behavior in study 1) remained similar 
across the 2 studies.  This is in line with the MCM approach, which argues that these measures are 
based on the evaluative, rather than the episodic component of the information. In contrast, both the 
DBE and ILA argue that there should be a strong correlation between (true) memory performance 
and the extent of the illusion on these measures. Indeed, if we take the memory sensitivity measures 
from the multilevel measures (BOldItem, which is similar to d from signal detection analysis - see the 
appendix) and relate it to global measures of frequency estimates and likability rating, we find no 
correlation between the interpersonal variation in the degree of the illusion in frequency estimates 
and impression ratings and memory performance. For the frequency estimates and the likability 
rating, the judgment for group A was subtracted from the judgment for group D for each participant. 
For both measures, higher values indicate more illusory correlation. As predicted by the MCM, neither 
frequency estimates, r= −.22 (p> .16), nor likability rating, r= .03 (p >.82), were significantly correlated 
with participants memory sensitivity, clearly supporting the MCM model. 
General Discussion 
Across two studies, we found a number of effects that are highly consistent with a multiple-
component model of IC, which argues that participants base their judgments on the evaluative 
information embedded in a group prototype which is highly accessible, rather than episodic 
behavioral information, whenever possible. This was apparent in the almost linear relationship 
between group size and group impressions that emerged in both studies, and the finding that this 
pattern was independent of interpersonal variation in behavioral memory. Indeed, the introduction of 
an improved design and analysis, particularly in Study 2, allowed a more complete analysis of the 
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interplay between evaluative and episodic information. And the results from this study provided 
further support for the predictions of the MCM: As group size decreased, judgments based on item-
memory revealed enhanced episodic memory for smaller groups and negative items, while judgments 
thought to be based on evaluative information showed the expected linear decrease in positivity.  
Implications for illusory correlation accounts 
In addition to the empirical support for the MCM, some of the results can be interpreted as being less 
than consistent with the MCM, and in fact appear to provide support for both distinctiveness-based 
and alternative accounts. In that sense, the findings from our studies parallel the IC literature as a 
whole.  Although a number of findings provide clear support for the MCM model, the whole set of 
results does not allow to eliminate any of the alternative accounts as viable. This further strengthens 
the point already raised, namely that the phenomena associated with illusory correlation are likely to 
be determined by multiple processes and types of information. Nevertheless, our studies shed light 
on the interplay of episodic and evaluative information in producing illusory correlation, and present a 
number of results that have implications for the different accounts of, and further research into, 
illusory correlation. 
 
Our studies demonstrated a number of findings that appear to be highly inconsistent with the original 
distinctiveness based explanation, which would predict that the illusion should appear only for the 
smallest and most undesirable group behaviors because these are most distinct. Our results show an 
increasing illusion from larger to smaller groups, when no distinctive behaviors are present (Study 1) 
and when D- items are in fact better encoded in memory (Study 2). These findings are problematic for 
the distinctiveness interpretation. Arguably, one could extent the DBE explanation to include more 
than one small group. Indeed, groups B and C could be considered to be more distinctive relative to 
Group A, and so one might expect some reduced IC effect for these groups as well (see Sherman et 
al., 1989). On the other hand, one could also argue that being of intermediate size and flanked by a 
larger and smaller group, groups B and C are in fact not very much salient or distinctive. The same 
issue arises when discussing the differentiation account and, to a lesser extent, the AT model. 
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Although these accounts can probably provide an explanation for our findings in terms of a 
meaningful, contextually-driven differentiation between the groups, it remains to be seen whether our 
results can be integrated into a wider process account of IC that avoids the inherent ambiguity of the 
distinctiveness concept (see also Fiedler, 2000). 
 
Neither the Fiedler (1991) nor McGarty et al. (1993) models give any special status to the rare 
behaviors of a small group. These models have trouble accounting for the enhanced memory for 
infrequent information, as described above.  Fiedler’s model could possibly account for these results 
by making a number of auxiliary assumptions concerning stimulus salience, for instance by 
introducing a parameter for increased weighting or reduced noise for infrequent events (see Fiedler, 
2000). However, the ILA would still predict that “the interpersonal variation in the degree of the 
illusion (in frequency estimates and impression ratings) is highly predictable from measures of 
memory performance” (Fielder et al., p129, 1993), which was refuted by the findings of study 2. In 
general, Study 2 revealed item-memory effects that support the MCM and DBE. These results are 
inconsistent with previous studies that seemed to support the information-loss approach.  However, 
they are quite consistent with a number of recent studies that strongly suggest that we might need to 
empirically revisit the distinctiveness approach, in order to explore its boundary conditions and the 
way enhanced item-memory is in fact causally related to IC (see for instance Risen, Gilovich & 
Dunning, 2007; Sherman, Conrey, & Groom, 2004; Sherman, Kruschke, Sherman, Percy, Petrocelli & 
Conrey, 2009).  The current results do no settle the empirical argument, but strongly suggest that an 
explanation of illusory correlation effects purely in terms of aggregation and uniform information loss 
is insufficient to account for the full range of the current findings.   
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Sherman and colleagues (2009) recently proposed an IC model 
based on Attention Theory (Kruschke, 2001, 2003). Both the MCM and AT model have a common 
ancestor in the Rescorla and Wagner model of associative learning (1972), but essentially represent 
different approaches to learning through error reduction (see Kruschke, 2001). Where the MCM is 
focused on the processing and representation of different types of information, models based on 
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attention theory describe how experience affects learning rates through attentional shifts.  This allows 
the AT model to address shifts in learning due to different stimulus dimensions, which the MCM 
currently does not address explicitly. One could argue that the absence of differential reading times 
could be interpreted as being inconsistent with the AT model (Sherman et al., 2009).  However, the 
current studies did not provide a direct test for the attention hypothesis, which would involve a design 
in which different stimulus dimensions such as common and rare attributes directly compete for 
attention, rather than being presented separately and sequentially. In fact, a design similar to the 
current one, but involving at least two distinct dimensions instead of a single global evaluative 
dimension (positive versus negative), would allow exploring the differences and similarities between 
the MCM and AT model. Successful attempts have been made to integrate both approaches 
(Kruschke, 1992). Applying such models to further explore how different types of information 
contribute to the IC phenomenon provides a critical avenue of future research. 
 
What can the present results contribute to our understanding of the cognitive process behind IC? The 
results strongly suggest that any explanation of IC must distinguish between at least evaluative and 
episodic components (see also Johnson & Mullen, 1994; Johnson et al., 2001). A semi-distributed 
representation or multi-component analysis, in which different aspects of stimulus information are 
encoded at different levels, could provide an answer to contradictory results from past research which 
revealed evidence for enhanced memory for infrequent events in some studies (Hamilton & Sherman, 
1989; McConnell et al., 1994) but not in others (Fiedler, 1991; 1996; Klauer and Meiser, 2000; 
Sanbonmatsu, Shavitt, Sherman & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1987). These conflicting results might result 
from the way information in the IC task is represented: on the evaluative or episodic level. It is 
possible that in some studies, IC was tapped mainly at the evaluative level (e.g., Fiedler, 1991) while 
other studies directed the focus on memory performance at the episodic level (e.g., McConnell et al., 
1994). Such a multi-component approach would be broadly consistent with dual-process models of 
group perception (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991; Stephan, Ageyer, 
Coates-Shrider, Stephan, & Abalakina, 1994), attitudes (Edwards, 1990; Edwards & von Hippel, 
1995) and person perception (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995). It 
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would also build on work that shows that perceivers can construct coherent prototypes from a wide 
range of information (Mayer & Bower, 1986) and is consistent with the idea that social information 
such as traits can be abstracted spontaneously during stimulus sentence processing (Uleman, Hon, 
Roman, and Moskowitz, 1996; Van Overwalle, Drenth, & Marsman, 1999). Importantly, an integrated 
process model of both evaluative and item-memory processes, as suggested by the MCM, would 
allow investigating systematically how the interaction between different processes contributes to the 
emergence of illusory correlations, and all of its associated outcomes.  
 
Conclusion 
The current studies confirm the predictions of a Multiple-Component Model about how memory 
performance would differ between various kinds of tasks in the illusory correlation paradigm, and 
under which circumstances these memory differences would be related to the perception of illusory 
correlations. First, it was shown that the typical IC bias as revealed in likeability ratings, frequency 
estimates and group assignments, appears to be driven by aggregate, evaluative information rather 
than differential memory for a certain stimulus category. This was clearly demonstrated by our group 
size manipulation in both studies, showing how the evaluative bias underlying the typical IC effects 
displayed a monotonic increase as group size decreases. Although a key prediction of both the MCM 
and ILA, the current studies are the first to produce this clear linear trend. The premise that 
contextual distinctiveness (McGarty et al, 2003; Sherman et al., 2009), or enhanced memory for 
distinctive undesirable minority behavior (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; McConnell et al., 1994) is a 
necessary condition for the formation of IC was also refuted in both experiments, and especially in 
Study 1, where the illusion appeared for a group that contained no distinctive behaviors. The novel 
design in study 2 demonstrated enhanced memory for discrete episodic traces as group size 
decreased, and particularly for the smallest group – however, contrary to distinctiveness-driven 
explanations, this did not affect the general pattern of evaluative IC effects, which remained strong.  
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In conclusion, we argue that the whole set of results suggests that a distributed memory 
representation, in which evaluative and item-specific information is represented separately, can 
potentially provide a more complete understanding of IC.  Although no single model can perfectly 
explain all the results, it is clear that any approach to IC will have to address the different types of 
information that underlie the phenomenon. Approaches that rely exclusively on either item-memory or 
regression principles can only provide partial explanations of the rich data set associated with the 
phenomenon, and will fail to explain how illusory correlation can occur both with and without 
enhanced memory, and how variations in the extent of the illusion are unrelated to variation in 
behavioral memory.  Although the multi-component model (MCM) did not receive full support, it does 
provide a potential explanation for these apparently contradictory results.   
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Table 1 
Number of statements presented as a function of group (A, B, C or D) and type of behavior (desirable versus undesirable) 
in Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Group: A B C D 
Desirable behaviors 16 8 4 2 
Undesirable behaviors 8 4 2 0 / 1 a 
 
a In Experiment 1, group D contained no undesirable behaviors while in Experiment 2, group D contained 1 undesirable 
behavior. 
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Table 2 
Experiment 1: Group Impression and Behavioral Memory as a function of type of behavior and group. 
  Group Group Size Linear Trend 
  A B C D F(3, 222)a F(1,74) 
Likeability Rating (Mean)  
 5.37 4.72 4.56 4.36 5.15** 8.82** 
Frequency Estimation (Mean)  
 .38 .47 .47 .38 3.48* ns 
Group Assignment (Observed and Actual Proportionb)  
     Desirable .48 (.53) .24 (.27) .17 (.13) .08 (.07) 
51.88*** n/a      Undesirable .36 (.57) .29 (.28) .24 (.14) .07 (.00) 
Free Recall (Proportion Correct)  
     Desirable .16 .14 .14 .22 2.50° ns 
     Undesirable .28 .25 .25 —- ns ns 
° p < .06, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
a The degrees of freedom may actually be smaller in some cases as some data points were missing. The effect of group size was 
analyzed across desirable and undesirable behaviors, except for the memory measures (see text).  
b Proportion = Number of assigned (un)desirable behaviors divided by total number of (un)desirable behaviors. 
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Table 3 
Experiment 2: Group Impression and Behavioral Memory in function of type of behavior and group. 
  Group Group Size Linear Trend 
  A B C D F(3, 126) a F(1,42) 
Likeability Rating (Mean)  
 6.87 5.70 5.66 5.22 9.91*** 13.87*** 
Frequency Estimation (Mean)  
 .32 .46 .50 .57 4.94** 7.95** 
Group Assignment (Observed and Actual Proportionb)  
     Desirable .34 (.53) .15 (.27) .10 (.13) .06 (.07) 
87.71*** n/a      Undesirable .14 (.53) .12 (.27) .09 (.13) .06 (.07) 
Free Recall (Proportion Correct)  
     Desirable .25 .19 .20 .29 
3.87** 5.39*      Undesirable .19 .22 .21 .33 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
a The effect of group size was analyzed across desirable and undesirable behaviors (see text).  
b Proportion = Number of assigned (un)desirable behaviors divided by total number of (un)desirable behaviors. 
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Appendix 
Accuracy analysis 
The present analysis uses accuracy, i.e. participants’ ability to correctly assign an item to a group, as 
dependent variable. The logit is a popular measure of accuracy: For the current analysis, it 
corresponds to the natural logarithm of the ratio of the odds of assigning an item to group X when the 
item is from Group X, over the odds of assigning an item to group X when the item is not from Group 
X. Zero corresponds to chance responding, while values above zero show memory. The population 
logit can be estimated by the coefficient in a multilevel logistic regression (Wright, Horry, & 
Skagerberg, 2009).  A number of computer programs allow random effects to be modelled with the 
following multilevel logistic regression (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Wright & London, 2009): 
logit(p[Accuracyij])= β0j +  β1Linearj 
Let Accuracyij be the accuracy on ith trial for the jth person, and β0j is the intercept. The subscript j 
means it has different values for each participant. We assume there is some grand mean, β0, and 
that values for participants will be normally distributed around this value with some unknown standard 
deviation to be estimated. β1Linearj is a vector coding for a linear trend. The subscript j means that 
the coefficient value can vary by participant. We assume that these values are normally distributed 
around β1. Multilevel generalized linear models are currently fit with methods that approximate 
maximum likelihood. For the current analysis, we used the Laplace method, which is the default for 
the package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 2008). It is part of the software R (R Development Core 
Team, 2008) and is available for free from the Comprehensive R Archive Network. 
 
Decoy analysis 
For this analysis, we created a separate binary DV by recoding participants’ responses in such a way 
that an assignment to groups A – D corresponded to an “old’ answer (coded 1), while a “decoy” 
answer corresponded to a “new” answer (coded 0). For any individual trial, a participant thus either 
categorizes an item as ‘old’ (item was presented before) or ‘new’ (item is a decoy). The probability of 
saying ‘old’ should increase if the item was presented previously, provided performance is above 
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chance. The probability of an ‘old’ response will vary among participants, and we also expect there to 
be differences among participants for how good their memories are. Therefore, we allow random 
effects for participants (see also Clark, 1973). This can be modelled with the following multilevel 
logistic regression (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Wright & London, 2009): 
Logit (Pr[SaysOldij])= β0j + β1OldItemj 
Let responseij be the response on ith trial for the jth person. The β0j is the intercept and relates to the 
response criterion in signal detection theory terminology (Wright & London, 2009). The subscripts j 
means it has different values for each participant, which In SDT terminology corresponds to people 
having different response criteria. We assume there is some grand mean, β0, and that values for 
participants will be normally distributed around this value with some unknown standard deviation to 
be estimated.  β1OldItemj provides a measure of accuracy. The subscript j means that values can 
vary by participant. Again, we assume that these values are normally distributed around β1. 
Participants performance should be above chance, so we expect that β1 > 0.  The coefficient for 
whether an item was seen before or not (here OldItem) measures discriminability (a measure of 
memory sensitivity comparable to d’, see De Carlo, 1998) and interactions between this and other 
variables show whether these other variables moderate accuracy (London & Wright, 2009).      
Of particular interest here is whether accuracy is moderated by group size or valence. In other 
words, we want to test whether accuracy (measured by OldItem) depends on whether an item is from 
a particular group, or is positive or negative in sign. This can be explored by testing interaction effects 
between β1 and other variables. This corresponds to moderator analysis, where one explores if the 
effect of one variable depends on the level of another variable. We used a stepwise approach to 
search for moderator variables. The main effect of each added component and its interaction with 
OldItem were included in the model. For instance, to test if valence of the item (negative versus 
positive) moderates accuracy, we first include the main effect of valence. If this improves the fit of the 
model, we subsequently tested the interaction between this term and β1. The same approach was 
used for all other variables mentioned in the text.  As with the accuracy model, we used the Laplace 
method to fit the models. 
